Stability vs. optimality in selfish ring routing by Chen, Bo et al.
 University of Warwick institutional repository: http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap 
 
This paper is made available online in accordance with 
publisher policies. Please scroll down to view the document 
itself. Please refer to the repository record for this item and our 
policy information available from the repository home page for 
further information.  
To see the final version of this paper please visit the publisher’s website. 
Access to the published version may require a subscription. 
 
Author(s): Bo Chen Xujin Chen;y Jie Hu Xiaodong Hu 
Article Title: Stability vs. Optimality in Selsh Ring Routing 
Year of publication: In press 
Link to published version: http://www.siam.org/journals/sidma.php 
Publisher statement: None 
 
Stability vs. Optimality in Selsh Ring Routing
Bo Chena Xujin Chenb;y Jie Huc Xiaodong Hub
aWarwick Business School, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, United Kingdom
bInstitute of Applied Mathematics, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China
cState Key Laboratory of Rail Trac Control and Safety, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing 100044, China
Abstract
We study the asymmetric atomic selsh routing in ring networks, which has diverse practical ap-
plications in network design and analysis. We are concerned with minimizing the maximum latency
of source-destination node-pairs over links with linear latencies. We obtain the rst constant upper
bound on the price of anarchy and signicantly improve the existing upper bounds on the price of sta-
bility. Moreover, we show that any optimal solution is a good approximate Nash equilibrium. Finally,
we present better performance analysis and fast implementation of pseudo-polynomial algorithms for
computing approximate Nash equilibria.
1 Introduction
Recent trends in the analysis and design of network routing take into account rational and selsh behaviors
of network users. Selsh routing [23] models network routing from a game-theoretic perspective, in which
network users are viewed as independent players participating in a non-cooperative game. Each player,
with his own pair of source and destination in the network, aims to establish a communication path
(between his source and destination) along which he experiences latency as low as possible, given the link
congestion caused by all the players. In the absence of a central authority who can impose and maintain
globally ecient routing strategies on the network trac [19], network designers are often interested in a
(pure) Nash equilibrium that is as close to the system optimum as possible, where the Nash equilibrium
is a \stable state" among the players, from which no player has the incentive to deviate unilaterally. The
notion of price of anarchy (PoA) (resp. price of stability (PoS)) was introduced in [17] (resp. [2]) to capture
the gap between the worst (resp. best) possible Nash equilibrium and the globally optimal solution. They
respectively quantify the maximum and minimum penalties in network performance required to ensure a
stable outcome.
The PoA and PoS of selsh routing depend on, among others, the network topologies, the number
of players, the latency functions on network links, as well as the system and individual objectives. In
Supported in part by the NSF of China under Grant No. 10531070, 10771209, 10721101, and Chinese Academy of
Sciences under Grant No. kjcx-yw-s7.
yCorresponding author: xchen@amss.ac.cn.
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this paper, we are concerned with selsh routing in ring networks with multiple players and linear load-
dependent latencies, whose PoA and PoS are evaluated against the social objective of minimizing the
maximum latency. We denote such a selsh ring routing model as the SRR for short.
Motivations and related works The SRR model under consideration falls within the general frame-
work of network congestion games, which are guaranteed to admit at least one Nash equilibrium [14].
In contrast to the symmetric setting of one single strategy set for all the players [10, 13, 15, 17], the
congestion game of the SRR is asymmetric (equivalently, it is a multi-commodity game) and models
more realistic and dicult scenarios where multiple players may have dierent locations in the network
and thus dierent sets of strategies to choose from [10, 16]. As splitting the trac usually causes the
problem of packet reassembly at the receiver and thus is generally avoided [4], the SRR model is atomic
and unsplittable [4, 7] in the sense that the unit trac demand from a source to a destination must be
satised by choosing a single path between the source and the destination.
Our motivation of studying selsh routing on the ring topology is threefold. Firstly, the PoS (hence
the PoA) of selsh routing with respect to minimizing the maximum latency in general networks can be
unbounded even if all latency functions are linear, which can be demonstrated in the following example of
an undirected network illustrated in Figure 1. An example of directed network has been provided in [9].
Figure 1. Unbounded PoS in undirected networks.
Example In the selsh routing on the undirected graph G in Figure 1, there are in total k = h3 + 1
(h  2) players 1; 2; : : : ; k. Each player i (1  i  k) sends one unit of ow along a path Pi between
node si and node ti, where s(j 1)h2+1 = s(j 1)h2+2 =    = sjh2 = sj and t(j 1)h2+1 = t(j 1)h2+2 =    =
tjh2 = tj for j = 1; 2; : : : ; h, meaning that players 1; 2; : : : ; h3 are evenly partitioned into h groups, and
all h2 players in the jth group (1  j  h) have (sj ; tj) as their source-destination pair. Let e be a link
of G, and x be the number of players who use e in sending their ows. The latency on e is hx if e = ej
for some 1  j  h, and x if e = e0j for some 1  j  h, and 0 otherwise. Player i experiences a latency
equal to the sum of latencies on edges of path Pi, 1  i  k. It is easy to see that the maximum latency
among all players is minimized when all players experience an identical latency of h2 in such a way that
all Pi, i = 1; 2; : : : ; k   1, avoid using e1; e2; : : : ; eh except Pk, which uses all of these links. On the other
hand, at any Nash equilibrium of the selsh routing, every ej (resp. e0j), 1  j  h, must be contained
by at least h   1 (resp. h2   h + 1) paths in P1; P2; : : : ; Pk; otherwise some player i could experience a
latency at least h2   h+ 3 on e0j (resp. a latency at least h2 + h on ej), and would strictly lower his own
latency by using ej in stead of e0j (resp. e
0
j in stead of ej) in his path. Thus player k always experiences
a latency greater than h(h2   h) in every Nash equilibrium. It follows that the PoS of the selsh routing
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on G is greater than h  1, which turns to innity as h!1. In light of this negative example, practical
(undirected) network design has to pay much attention to selecting suitable topologies so that small PoS,
as well as small PoA, can be guaranteed.
Secondly, rings have been a fundamental topology frequently encountered in communication networks,
and attract considerable attention and eorts from the research community [3, 5, 6, 8, 24, 25], especially
in design of approximation algorithms for combinatorial optimization problems. Our study of selsh
routing on the ring topology attempts not only to provide a good starting point for evaluating the PoA
and PoS in asymmetric network congestion games, but also to enhance the diversity of network topologies
amenable to the minimax criterion.
Thirdly, even in a ring, the problem of routing in response to communication requests is not trivial.
It has not been known until the present work whether the SRR admits a constant PoA. Upper bounds
of 6:83 and 4:57 on the PoS respectively with linear latency and homogenous linear latency have been
established in [9]. The authors have also proved the existence of an optimal solution which approximates
a Nash equilibrium by a factor of 54. Improving these bounds or showing their tightness is very desirable
for better quantifying the PoS and the instability of ecient solutions, which in turn will provide improved
guidelines for achieving a good balance between stability and eciency in the SRR network design.
Main contributions With new ideas and techniques in addition to more elaborate analysis, we con-
tribute to the study of the SRR and of atomic selsh routing in multi-commodity networks [4, 20] by prov-
ing four groups of main results: (1) The PoS is at most 3.9, which reduces to 3.5 for homogenous latency;
(2) The PoA has a constant upper bound of 16; (3) Any optimal solution is a 9-approximate Nash equi-
librium (see Denition 2.2); (4) A polynomial-time combinatorial algorithm and pseudo-polynomial-time
convergence combined compute a (1; 11:7)-approximate Nash equilibrium (see Denition 2.2). In sum-
mary, our work provides a strong justication on more attractive features of the ring topology compared
with general networks [12], apart from simplicity and fault-tolerance of rings in real-world applications.
Paper organization The SRR model is formally dened and some basic properties are presented in
Section 2. After evaluation of the PoS in Section 3 with improved bounds, we show in Section 4 a constant
bound on the PoA. Then we prove in Section 5 the existence of (9; 1)-approximate Nash equilibria. In
Section 6 we provide algorithms for nding good approximate Nash equilibria in pseudo-polynomial time.
Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 7 with computational study of the PoS in the SRR of 2 players
and 3 players, respectively, which shows that the corresponding PoSs are 1.25 and 1.26, respectively.
2 The selsh ring routing model
This section introduces the problem formulation, as well as concepts and notation to be used in the paper.
The basic properties of Nash equilibria established will play an important role in our theoretical proofs
and algorithm design.
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2.1 The model
Our selsh ring routing (SRR) model is specied by a triple (R; l; (si; ti)ki=1), usually called an SRR
instance. As illustrated in Figure 2, the underlying network is a ring R = (V;E), an undirected cycle,
with node set V = fv1; v2; : : : ; vng of n nodes and link set E = fei = vivi+1 : i = 1; 2; : : : ; ng of n links,
where vn+1 = v1. By writing P  R, we mean that P is a subgraph of R (possibly R itself) with node set
V (P ) and link set E(P ). Each link e 2 E is associated with a load-dependent linear latency (function)
le(x) = aex+ be, where ae, be are nonnegative constants, and x is an integer variable indicating the load
on e.
Without loss of generality, all ae and be, e 2 E, are assumed to be integers. (2.1)
The latency l is said to be homogeneous if be = 0 for all e 2 E. There are k source-destination node
pairs (si; ti), i = 1; 2; : : : ; k, corresponding to k players 1; 2; : : : ; k. Each player i (1  i  k) has a
communication request for routing one unit of ow from his source si 2 V to his destination ti 2 V , and
his strategy set consists of two internally disjoint paths Pi and Pi in ring R with ends si and ti satisfying
V (Pi) \ V ( Pi) = fsi; tig and Pi [ Pi = R, i = 1; 2; : : : ; k. (2.2)
We set Pi := Pi for i = 1; 2; : : : ; k. Dierent players may have the same source-destination pair, and
vertices si; ti; i = 1; 2; : : : ; k are not necessarily distinct. On the other hand, k  2 and si 6= ti, i =
1; 2; : : : ; k, are assumed to avoid triviality.
Figure 2. The SRR instances.
A (feasible) routing f for the SRR instance is a 0-1 function f on multiset P := [ki=1fPi; Pig such that
fPi + f Pi = 1 for every i = 1; 2; : : : ; k. In view of the correspondence between f and player strategies
adopted for the SRR instance, we abuse the notation slightly by writing f = fQ1; Q2; : : : ; Qkg with the
understanding that, for each i = 1; 2; : : : ; k, the one unit of ow requested by player i is routed along
path Qi 2 fPi; Pig, and correspondingly f(Qi) = 1 > 0 = f( Qi). Also we write Qi 2 f for i = 1; 2; : : : ; k.
Each link e 2 E bears a load with respect to f dened as the integer fe :=
P
P2P:e2E(P ) f(P ) = jfQi :
e 2 E(Qi); i = 1; 2; : : : ; kgj equal the number of paths in fQ1; Q2; : : : ; Qkg each of which go through e.
Every P  R is associated with a nonnegative integer lP (f) :=
P
e2E(P ) le(fe) =
P
e2E(P )(aefe + be),
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which indicates roughly the total latencies of links on P experienced in f . (The wording \indicates
roughly" changes to \equals" when every link of P is used by some player in the routing f .) Naturally,
the maximum latencies experienced by individuals and the system are
Mi(f) := lQi(f) for i = 1; 2; : : : ; k; and M(f) :=
k
max
i=1
Mi(f); (2.3)
where Mi(f) is the (maximum) latency of player i with respect to f (the \maximum" can be dropped in
view that the routing is unsplittable), and M(f) is the maximum latency of the routing f . A routing f
is optimal if M(f) is minimum among all routings for the SRR instance.
2.2 Approximate Nash equilibria
A Nash equilibrium is characterized by the property that no player has the incentive to change his strategy
unilaterally. A routing f = fQ1; Q2; : : : ; Qkg is a Nash equilibrium or simply a Nash routing if
lQi(f) 
X
e2E( Qi)
le(fe + 1) for all i = 1; 2; : : : ; k: (2.4)
As a network congestion game [14], the SRR possesses at least one Nash routing whose existence can be
proved by using potential function , dened as follows:
(f) =
X
e2E
feX
x=1
le(x): (2.5)
The domain of the potential function is the set of routings for the SRR instance. For routing f =
fQ1; Q2; : : : ; Qkg, reversing the summations, the potential of f becomes
(f) =
kX
i=1
X
e2E(Qi)
le
 jfQh : h  i; e 2 E(Qh)gj;
from which one can easily derive the following well-known result [21, 18].
Lemma 2.1 Let routing ~f result from routing f due to a single player i changing his adopted strategy
(path). Then the following hold:
(i) (f)  ( ~f) =Mi(f) Mi( ~f).
(ii) f is a Nash routing if and only if (f) is a local minimum of . 2
Denition 2.2 Let f be an optimal routing and ;   1 be two real numbers. A routing f =
fQ1; Q2; : : : ; Qkg is called an -approximate Nash routing if
lQi(f)  
X
e2E( Qi)
le(fe + 1); for all i = 1; 2; : : : ; k:
If additionally M(f)  M(f), then f is called an (; )-approximate Nash routing.
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When  = 1, routing f is a Nash equilibrium, and thus also referred to as a (1; )-Nash routing. In
the SRR instance (R; l; (si; ti)ki=1), the price of stability (PoS) is dened as the minimum  for which
(1; )-Nash routing exists; and the price of anarchy (PoA) is dened as the minimum  for which every
Nash routing is a (1; )-Nash routing. The notions of the PoS and PoA extend to the SRR problem of
all SRR instances, whose PoS (resp. PoA) is set to be the supremum of PoS (resp. PoA) over all SRR
instances.
As an example, for the SRR instance depicted in Figure 2(c), where 0 < " < 1=2, enumeration
of all four feasible routings shows that its unique optimal routing f = fs1s2t1; s2t1t2g has maximum
latency M(f) = 4   ", and is a ( 4 "4 2" ; 1)-approximate Nash routing, while its unique Nash routing
f = fs1s2t1; s2s1t2g has maximum latency M(f) = 5   3". Hence the PoA and PoS of this instance
both tend to 5=4 as " approaches 0. In addition, the example suggests a small improvement on the lower
bound of the PoS  8=7 for 2-player SRR stated in Theorem 2 of [9].
Remark 2.3 The price of stability is at least 5=4 for the SRR problem with k = 2 players.
2.3 Basic properties
We investigate Nash routings for an arbitrary SRR instance I = (R; l; (si; ti)ki=1). For any P  R and
any routing f for I, we often consider
lP (f) :=
X
e2E(P )
le(fe) =
X
e2E(P )
(aefe + be)
as the sum of
laP (f) :=
X
e2E(P )
aefe and lbP (f) :=
X
e2E(P )
be:
Dene notation:
jjP jja :=
X
e2E(P )
ae; jjP jjb :=
X
e2E(P )
be; and jjP jj := jjP jja + jjP jjb:
It is worth noting that the equation lbP (f) = jjP jjb always holds, though in contrast the integer laP (f)
may be smaller or bigger than or equal to jjP jja. So for any routing f we particularly have
lP (f) = laP (f) + l
b
P (f) = l
a
P (f) + jjP jjb: (2.6)
When P ( R) is a path, complementary to it is the other path P  R whose edge-disjoint union with P
forms R. In particular, we will make explicit or implicit use of the following equations in our discussion:
jjP jja + jj P jja = jjRjja; jjP jjb + jj P jjb = jjRjjb; and jjP jj+ jj P jj = jjRjj: (2.7)
Throughout the paper, we denote by fO = fQ1; Q2; : : : ; Qkg a given non-Nash routing for the SRR
instance I = (R; l; (si; ti)ki=1) in which players 1; 2; : : : ; k are named such that for a minimum j with
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1  j  k,
fN = f Q1; : : : ; Qj ; Qj+1; : : : ; Qkg is a Nash routing for I; and
 := maxji=1
jj Qijja
jjQijja =
jj Q1jja
jjQ1jja ; so l
a
R(f
N )  maxf; 1g laR(fO):
(2.8)
If Qp = Qq for some p; q with 1  p 6= q  j, then without loss of generality fp; qg = fj   1; jg; it follows
that Qj 1 = Qj 2 fN , Qj = Qj 1 2 fN , and we can express fN as fN = f Q1; : : : ; Qj 2; Qj 1; : : : ; Qkg.
This contradicts the minimality of j, and gives
f Q1; : : : ; Qjg \ fQ1; : : : ; Qjg = ;: (2.9)
By (2.7), we see from jj Q1jja = jjQ1jja in (2.8) that
jjQ1jja = jjRjja
 + 1
: (2.10)
Since R is the edge-disjoint union of Qi and Qi for every i = 1; 2; : : : ; k, from (2.6), with R in place of P ,
we derive
l Qi(f
N ) + lQi(f
N ) = lR(fN ) = laR(f
N ) + lbR(f
N ) = laR(f
N ) + jjRjjb for i = 1; 2; : : : ; k: (2.11)
Applying (2.4) to the Nash routing fN = f Q1; : : : ; Qj ; Qj+1; : : : ; Qkg, we obtain
l Qi(f
N ) lQi(fN )+jjQijja for i=1; 2; : : : ; j;
lQi(f
N ) l Qi(fN )+jj Qijja for i=j+1; j+2; : : : ; k:
(2.12)
With the denition ofM(fN ) given by (2.3), an easy case analysis on (2.12) shows thatM(fN ) is bounded
above by
1
2

lQ(fN ) + l Q(f
N ) + maxfjjQjja; jj Qjjag

; for Q 2 fN with lQ(fN ) = M(fN );
which, in combination with (2.11), gives
M(fN )  lR(f
N ) + jjRjja
2
=
laR(f
N ) + jjRjja + jjRjjb
2
=
laR(f
N ) + jjRjj
2
: (2.13)
Note from (2.11) and (2.12) that lR(fN ) = l Qi(f
N ) + lQi(f
N )  2lQi(fN ) + jjQijja for i = 1; 2; : : : ; j.
Thus the leftmost inequality in (2.13) implies
M(fN )  lQi(fN ) +
jjQijja
2
+
jjRjja
2
; for i = 1; 2; : : : ; j: (2.14)
These inequalities suggest an approach to upper bounding M(fN ): getting an estimation of the smallest
lQi(f
N )+ 12 jjQijja among i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; jg. Observe from (2.8) that jjQ1jja = minji=1 jjQijja. It is desirable
that lQ1(f
N ) is not large, which constitutes the essence of the following lemma.
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Lemma 2.4 If positive numbers  and  satisfy  = M(fN )=M(fO), lR(fO)  2M(fO), and  > ,
then the following hold:
(i)   maxf; 1g+ jjRjja=(2M(fO)).
(ii) (      2) lQ1(fN )  2(   )M(fO) + ( + )jjQ1jja + jjRjja   (   )jjRjjb:
Proof. From (2.13) we have M(fN )  12 (laR(f) + jjRjja), which in combination of (2.8) implies (i):
 =
M(fN )
M(fO)
 maxf; 1glR(f
O) + jjRjja
2M(fO)
 maxf; 1g+ jjRjja
2M(fO)
:
To prove (ii), we deduce from (2.13) that laR(f
N )  2M(fN )   jjRjj = 2M(fO)   jjRjj. Thus
laR(f
N )   lR(fO)  jjRjj which can be expressed using (2.6) as
jX
i=1
jj Qijja +
kX
i=j+1
jjQijja  

jX
i=1
jjQijja + 

kX
i=j+1
jjQijja + 

jjRjjb   jjRjja   jjRjjb:
By applying (2.7) and substituting jjRjja   jj Qijja for jjQijja, i = 1; 2; : : : ; j, in the above inequality we
obtain
jX
i=1
jj Qijja  


j  jjRjja  
jX
i=1
jj Qijja

+



  1
 kX
i=j+1
jjQijja +



  1

jjRjjb   jjRjja:
Rearranging terms in the above inequality yields



+ 1
 jX
i=1
jj Qijja 



j   1

jjRjja +



  1
 kX
i=j+1
jjQijja +



  1

jjRjjb:
Since = > 1, ignoring the nonnegative middle term on the right-hand side and dividing both sides by
positive number =+ 1, we derive from the above inequality that
jX
i=1
jj Qijja  j   
 + 
jjRjja +    
 + 
jjRjjb: (2.15)
Let us now consider sum
Pj
i=1 jj Qi\Q1jja, which equals the total contributions of paths Q1; Q2; : : : ; Qj
in the Nash routing fN to the value of laQ1(f
N ). Clearly, the sum of the contributions is at least
laQ1(f
N ) 
kX
i=j+1
jjQijja  laQ1(fN )  laR(fO);
and thus at least laQ1(f
N )  lR(fO) + jjRjjb by (2.6). It follows from lR(fO)  2M(fO) that
jX
i=1
jj Qi \Q1jja  laQ1(fN )  2M(fO) + jjRjjb: (2.16)
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On the other hand, since R is the link-disjoint union of Q1 and Q1, we have
laQ1(f
N ) 
jX
i=1
jj Qi \ Q1jja 
jX
i=1
 jj Qijja   jjQ1jja :
In turn, using (2.15) and jjRjja = ( + 1)jjQ1jja in (2.10), we can lower bound laQ1(fN ) as follows:
laQ1(f
N ) 
jX
i=1
 jj Qijja   jjQ1jja
 j   
 + 
jjRjja   j  jjQ1jja +    
 + 
jjRjjb
= j

( + 1)
 + 
  1

jjQ1jja   
 + 
jjRjja +    
 + 
jjRjjb
    
 + 
jX
i=1
jj Qi \Q1jja + (   )jjRjjb   jjRjja
 + 
:
Furthermore, it follows from (2.16) that
laQ1(f
N )     
 + 

laQ1(f
N )  2M(fO) + jjRjjb

+
(   )jjRjjb   jjRjja
 + 
: (2.17)
Applying (2.12) and (2.6), we have
lQ1(f
N ) + jjQ1jja  l Q1(fN ) = laQ1(fN ) + jj Q1jjb:
Combining the above inequality with (2.17) and using jjRjjb = jjQ1jjb + jj Q1jjb  jjQ1jjb, we deduce that
lQ1(f
N ) + jjQ1jja     
 + 

laQ1(f)  2M(fO) + jjRjjb

+
(   )jjRjjb   jjRjja
 + 
+ jj Q1jjb
    
 + 

laQ1(f
N )  2M(fO) + jjQ1jjb

+
 (jjQ1jjb + jj Q1jjb)  jjRjja   jjRjjb
 + 
    
 + 

lQ1(f
N )  2M(fO)

+
 jjRjjb   jjRjja   jjRjjb
 + 
=
   
 + 

lQ1(f
N )  2M(fO)

+
(   )jjRjjb   jjRjja
 + 
Thus we obtain
( + )
 
lQ1(f
N ) + jjQ1jja
  (   )lQ1(fN )  2M(fO)+ (   )jjRjjb   jjRjja;
which is equivalent to the inequality in (ii). The lemma is then proved. 2
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Lemma 2.5 If lR(fO)  8M(fO) and jjRjja  3:5M(fO), then  =M(fN )=M(fO)  16.
Proof. Assume to the contrary  > 16. With  = 4, we deduce from Lemma 2.4 that
 = maxf; 1g  

  jjRjja
2M(fO)
>
16
4
  3:5
8
= 3:5625; (2.18)
(      8) lQ1(fN )  8(   4)M(fO) + ( + 4)jjQ1jja + 4jjRjja   (   4)jjRjjb:
Note from (2.18) that       8 > 0, and from (2.10) that
jjQ1jja = jjRjja
 + 1
 3:5M(f
O)
 + 1
:
With (2.14) we get
M(fN )  lQ1(fN ) +
jjQ1jja
2
+
jjRjja
2
 8(   4)
      8M(f
O) +

 + 4
      8 +
1
2

jjQ1jja +

4
      8 +
1
2

jjRjja
 8(   4)
      8M(f
O) +
( + 1)
2(      8) 
3:5M(fO)
 + 1
+
(   1)
2(      8)  3:5M(f
O)
=
19:5   64
2(      8)M(f
O):
As  > 0 by (2.18), the derivative of 19:5 642(  8) with respect to  is negative for all  > 0. So, using
 > 16, we obtain
16 <  =
M(fN )
M(fO)
 19:5   64
2(      8) 
19:5(16)  64
2(16   16  8) =
312   64
32   48 :
Now 312 6432 48 > 16 implies  < 3:52, a contradiction to (2.18), proving the lemma. 2
3 Tighter bounds on the prices of stability
This section is devoted to the establishment of the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1 The price of stability of the SRR problem is at most 3:9 and is at most 3:5 if the linear
latency functions are homogenous.
To establish Theorem 3.1, we are to use a number of lemmas and theorems. Suppose we are given a
routing fO = fQ1; Q2; : : : ; Qkg for an SRR instance I = (R; l; (si; ti)ki=1) and fO is not a Nash routing.
Therefore, some player h 2 f1; 2; : : : ; kg can benet from unilaterally changing his strategy provided
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strategies of other players remain the same. It follows that the SRR instance admits a routing f 0 =
fQ1; : : : ; Qh 1; Qh; Qh+1; : : : ; Qkg for which we have
0  l Qh(fO) + jj Qhjja = l Qh(f 0) < lQh(fO) M(fO); (3.1)
laR(f
O)  lR(fO) = lQh(fO) + l Qh(fO) < 2M(fO)  jj Qhjja: (3.2)
Since l Qh(f
0)  jj Qhjj and lQh(fO)  jjQhjj, it follows from (2.7) and (3.1) that
jjQijj+ jj Qijj = jjRjj = jjRjja + jjRjjb = jjQhjj+ jj Qhjj < 2M(fO) for i = 1; 2; : : : ; k: (3.3)
In the rest of this section we denote by fN an arbitrary Nash routing for the instance I. Let  =
M(fN )=M(fO). We are to show   3:9 for general linear latencies and   3:5 for homogeneous
latencies. To this end, we assume that
 :=
M(fN )
M(fO)
> 3:5; (3.4)
on which we derive a contradiction in either case. Since fN 6= fO, we may assume that fN and fO are
as described in Section 2.3. Observe from (3.2) and (3.4) that Lemma 2.4 applies with  = 1, yielding
  maxf; 1g+ jjRjj
2M(fO)
; (3.5)
(      2) lQ1(fN )  2(   1)M(fO) + ( + 1)jjQ1jja + jjRjja   (   1)jjRjjb: (3.6)
The combination of (3.3), (3.4), and (3.5) implies
 > 2:5: (3.7)
Lemma 3.1 laR(f
N )  2M(fO)  (   1)jjRjja.
Proof. Recall that player h has the incentive to change his strategy Qh in fO to Qh (see (3.1) and the
paragraph preceding it). The linearity of the latency functions and (3.2) give
laR(f
N ) = laR(f
O) +
jX
i=1
 jj Qijja   jjQijja  2M(fO)  jj Qhjja + jX
i=1
 jj Qijja   jjQijja;
from which laR(f
N ) can be bounded above by using the maximality of  dened in (2.8), and by distin-
guishing between two cases: h  j or h > j. Note from (3.7) that  > 1. If h  j, then
laR(f
N )  2M(fO)  jjQhjja + (   1)
jX
i6=h;i=1
jjQijja
 2M(fO)  jjQhjja + (   1)laR(fO)
 2M(fO)  jjQhjja + (   1)
 
2M(fO)  jj Qhjja

= 2M(fO)  (   1)jjRjja   jjQhjja
 2M(fO)  (   1)jjRjja:
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If h > j, we can similarly obtain
laR(f
N )  2M(fO)  jj Qhjja + (   1)
jX
i=1
jjQijja
 2M(fO)  (   1)jjQhjja + (   1)
 jX
i=1
jjQijja + jjQhjja

 2M(fO)  (   1)jjQhjja + (   1)laR(fO)
 2M(fO)  (   1)jjQhjja + (   1)(2M(fO)  jj Qhjja)
= 2M(fO)  (   1)jjRjja:
The proof is then nished. 2
Based on (3.1){(3.7) and Lemma 3.1, we establish Theorem 3.1 with two stronger statements in
Theorems 3.2 and 3.3 below, the former dealing with the case of homogeneous latencies, and the latter
general linear latencies.
Theorem 3.2 Given any routing f for an SRR instance with homogeneous linear latency functions,
either f is a Nash routing, or M(fN )  3:5M(f) holds for all Nash routings fN for the SRR instance.
Proof. In the case of homogeneous linear latency functions, jj  jj = jj  jja holds, subscript and superscript
a can be dropped, and everything with subscript or superscript b is 0. If the theorem is not true, then
we must have f = fO as a non-Nash routing, and a Nash routing fN as studied above. From Lemma 3.1
and M(fN )  (lR(fN ) + jjRjj)=2 in (2.13), we derive
M(fN )  M(fO)     2
2
jjRjj: (3.8)
Recall from (3.7) that  > 2:5. Thus the combination of (3.8) and (3.4) implies
   > 3:5: (3.9)
So    2 > 0 is a positive number. Using it to divide both sides of the inequality in (3.6), we obtain
lQ1(f
N )  2(   1)
      2M(f
O) +
 + 1
      2 jjQ1jj+
1
      2 jjRjj;
which implies
lQ1(f
N ) +
jjQ1jj
2
+
jjRjj
2
 2(   1)
      2M(f
O) +

 + 1
      2 +
1
2

jjQ1jj+

1
      2 +
1
2

jjRjj
=
2(   1)
      2M(f
O) +
( + 1)
2(      2) jjQ1jj+
(   1)
2(      2) jjRjj:
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Since M(fN )  lQ1(fN ) + jjQ1jj2 + jjRjj2 by (2.14) and jjQ1jj = jjRjj+1 by (2.10), we obtain
M(fN )  2(   1)
      2M(f
O) +

2(      2) jjRjj: (3.10)
By (3.9), both  and (  2)(    2) are positive numbers. Observe that the coecients of jjRjj
in (3.8) and (3.10) are negative and positive, respectively. Let us multiply both sides of (3.8) by ,
multiply both sides of (3.10) by (   2)(      2), and put the two resulting inequalities together. As
a result, we can cancel the terms involving jjRjj, and get
M(fN )
M(fO)
 3
2   4   2 + 4
2   2   2 + 2 + 4 ;
which is true since both 2   2   2 + 2 + 4 and M(fO) are positive as implied by (3.9) and
(3.1) respectively. Observe that the right hand side of the above inequality has both numeration and
denominator positive. Plugging M(fN )=M(fO) =  in (3.4) into the above inequality, we have
(2   2 + 2)2   (32   2   4) + 2   4  0:
Notice from (3.9) that 2   2 + 2 > 0, we obtain
  3
2   2   4 +p(32   2   4)2   4(2   2 + 2)(2   4)
2(2   2 + 2) :
Consider the expression on the right hand side of the above inequality as a function () of variable
 2 (3:5;1) (recalling (3.9)). The unique root of 0() = 0 in (3:5;1) is  := 4:4562, at which ()
attains a local maximum 3:4959. It follows that  < 3:496, a contradiction to (3.9). The theorem is then
proved. 2
Theorem 3.3 Given any routing f for an SRR instance, either f is a Nash routing, or M(fN ) 
3:9M(f) holds for all Nash routings fN for the SRR instance.
Proof. Suppose f = fO is not a Nash routing, and there exists a Nash routing fN such that the
(in)equalities in (3.1){(3.7) and Lemma 3.1 are all satised. From (2.13) and Lemma 3.1, we obtain
M(fN )  M(fO)     1
2
jjRjja + 12 jjRjj:
Using jjRjj < 2M(fO) in (3.3), we get an analogue to (3.8):
M(fN )  ( + 1)M(fO)     1
2
jjRjja: (3.11)
Since  > 1 by (3.7) and  =M(fN )=M(fO) by (3.4), the inequality in (3.11) further enables us to work
on the following (from which we will derive a contradiction):
 + 1 >  > 3:9: (3.12)
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Hence    2 is positive, which allows us to divide both sides of the inequality in (3.6) by    2,
and obtain
lQ1(f
N )  2(   1)
      2M(f
O) +
 + 1
      2 jjQ1jja +
jjRjja   (   1)jjRjjb
      2 :
It follows from (2.14) that
M(fN )  lQ1(fN ) +
jjQ1jja
2
+
jjRjja
2
 2(   1)
      2M(f
O) +

 + 1
      2 +
1
2

jjQ1jja + jjRjja   (   1)jjRjjb
      2 +
1
2
jjRjja
=
2(   1)
      2M(f
O) +
( + 1)
2(      2) jjQ1jja +
(   1)
2(      2) jjRjja  
   1
      2 jjRjjb:
Notice from (3.12) that  1  2 jjRjjb  0, which implies
M(fN )  2(   1)
      2M(f
O) +
( + 1)
2(      2) jjQ1jja +
(   1)
2(      2) jjRjja:
Recalling jjQ1jja = jjRjja+1 in (2.10), we have
M(fN )  2(   1)
      2M(f
O) +

2(      2) jjRjja: (3.13)
Let us multiply both sides of (3.11) by positive number , multiply both sides of (3.13) by positive
number (   1)(      2), and then add the resulting inequalities together. The terms involving jjRjja
vanish, so we arrive at
M(fN ) + (   1)(      2)M(fN )  ( + 1)M(fO) + (   1)  2(   1)M(fO):
Since M(fN ) = M(fO) by (3.4), the above inequality is equivalent to
(2      2 +  + 2)  M(fO)  (32      2 + 2)M(fO):
Dividing both sides of the inequality by the positive number M(fO) (recall (3.1)), we get
(2    + 1)2   (32 +    2) + 2   2  0:
By (3.12), 2    + 1 > 0, which enforces
  3
2 +    2 +p(32 +    2)2   4(2    + 1)(2   2)
2(2    + 1) =: ():
The unique root of 0() = 0 in interval (2:9;1) (recalling (3.12)) is  := 2:46, at which () attains a
local maximum 3:89. It follows that  < 3:9, a contradiction to (3.12). The theorem is established. 2
Putting an optimal routing in place of f in Theorems 3.2 and 3.3, we immediately obtain the following
corollary, which strengthens Theorem 3.1.
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Corollary 3.4 Given any SRR instance, either every optimal routing is a Nash routing, or the price of
anarchy of the instance is at most 3:9, and at most 3:5 if all linear latency functions are homogeneous.
4 A constant upper bound on the price of anarchy
Further to Corollary 3.4, a universal constant upper bound on the PoA of all SRR instances is established
in this section.
Theorem 4.1 The price of anarchy of the SRR problem is at most 16.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary Nash routing fN for an SRR instance I = (R; l; (si; ti)ki=1). For any
subgraphs P and Q of the ring R, by P [ Q (resp. P \ Q) we mean the subgraph of R with node set
V (P ) [ V (Q) (resp. V (P ) \ V (Q)) and link set E(P ) [ E(Q) (resp. E(P ) \ E(Q)). Clearly I admits
an optimal routing f that is irredundant in the sense that any two paths P;Q 2 f with P [ Q = R
are link-disjoint. Set  := M(fN )=M(f). It suces to show   16. To this end, we may assume
f = fO 6= fN as described in Section 2.3, as otherwise  = 1 and we are done.
If some Qg and Qh with 1  g < h  j are link-disjoint, then Qg [ Qh = R, and since fO is
irredundant, it must be the case that Qg = Qh and Qh = Qg, a contradiction to (2.9). Hence
E( Qg) \E( Qh) 6= ; for all 1  g < h  j: (4.1)
With (2.11), we may assume
lQi(f
N ) + l Qi(f
N ) = lR(fN ) > 16M(fO) for all i = 1; 2; : : : ; k; (4.2)
as otherwise (2.3) implies M(fN )  lR(fN )  16M(fO) giving   16. By denition, jjQijj  lQi(fO) 
M(fO) for all i = 1; 2; : : : ; k. For the Nash routing fN , we deduce from (2.12) and (4.2) that
lQi(f
N ) l Qi(fN ) M(fO) and lQi(fN )
l Qi(f
N )+lQi(f
N ) M(fO)
2
>7:5M(fO) for 1 ij: (4.3)
If some Qg with 1  g  j is link-disjoint from [ji=1 Qi, then lQg (fN )  lQg (fO)  M(fO) indicates a
contradiction to (4.3). So we have
E(Qg) \

[ji=1E( Qi)

6= ; for all 1  g  j; in particular j  2: (4.4)
It is not dicult to see from (4.1) and (4.4) that one of the following three cases (illustrated in Figure 3)
must be true:
Case 1: There exist p, q, and r with 1  p < q < r  j such that Qp [ Qq  R, Qq [ Qr  R,
Qr [ Qp  R, and Qp [ Qq [ Qr = R.
Case 2: There exist p and q with 1  p < q  j such that Qp [ Qq = R.
Case 3: There exist p and q with 1  p < q  j such that [ji=1 Qi  Qp [ Qq  R.
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Case 1
-Qp
Qq-
-Qp
Qq-
Case 3
-Qp
-
Qq-
Qr-
-Qp
Case 2
Qq
Figure 3. Possible congurations of fN when lR(f
N ) > 16M(fO).
Our case analysis goes as follows:
Case 1. It is easy to see that Qp [Qq [Qr = R, which implies
jjRjja  jjRjj  lR(fO)  lQp(fO) + lQq (fO) + lQr (fO)  3M(fO):
Hence Lemma 2.5 guarantees   16 as desired.
Case 2. Notice that Qp  Qq and Qq is the link-disjoint union of Qp \ Qq and Qp. It follows from (4.3)
that lQp(f
N )  l Qp(fN ) M(fO)  lQq (fN ) M(fO)  l Qq (fN )  2M(fO); yielding
l Qp\ Qq (f
N ) = l Qq (f
N )  lQp(fN )  2M(fO): (4.5)
Observe that R is the link-disjoint union of Qp, Qq and Qp \ Qq, implying
jjRjja  jjQpjja + jjQqjja + 12 l Qp\ Qq (f
N )  3M(fO):
When lR(fO)  8M(fO), Lemma 2.5 gives   16 as desired. When lR(fO) > 8M(fO), we have
l Qp\ Qq (f
O) = lR(fO)  lQp(fO)  lQq (fO) > 8M(fO)  2M(fO) = 6M(fO):
Let S := fQ 2 fO : Q  Qp \ Qqg denote the set of paths in fO all contained in Qp \ Qq. Then
[Q2SQ  Qp \ Qq. Note that
l[Q2SQ(f
O) + 4M(fO)  l Qp\ Qq (fO) > 6M(fO);
so we have
l[Q2SQ(f
O) > 2M(fO);
which, together with l Qp\ Qq (f
N )  2M(fO) in (4.5), enforces Q 62 fN for some member Q 2 S. So
Q = Qi belongs to S for some i with 1  i  j. However, it follows from (4.5) that lQi(fN ) 
l Qp\ Qq (f
N )  2M(fO) contradicting to (4.3).
Case 3. In this case [ji=1 Qi  Qp [ Qq implies lQp\Qq (fN )  lQp\Qq (fO)  lQp(fO) M(fO). Since Qq
is the link-disjoint union of Qp \Qq and a subpath of Qp, we derive from (4.3) that
lQp(f
N )  l Qp(fN ) M(fO)  lQq (fN )  lQp\Qq (fN ) M(fO)
 lQq (fN )  2M(fO)  l Qq (fN )  3M(fO);
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yielding
l Qp\ Qq (f
N ) = l Qq (f
N ) 

lQp(f
N )  lQp\Qq (fN )

 3M(fO) + lQp\Qq (fN )  4M(fO): (4.6)
Notice that
jjRjja  lQp(fO) + lQq (fO)  lQp\Qq (fO) +
1
2
l Qp\ Qq (f
N )
 2M(fO)  lQp\Qq (fN ) +
1
2
 
3M(fO) + lQp\Qq (f
N )
  3:5M(fO):
Similar to Case 2, when lR(fO)  8M(fO), Lemma 2.5 ensures   16. When lR(fO) > 8M(fO), we
have l Qp\ Qq (f
O) > 6M(fO), and set S := fQ 2 fO : Q  Qp \ Qqg. Thus l[Q2SQ(fO) + 2M(fO) 
l Qp\ Qq (f
O) > 6M(fO) gives l[Q2SQ(f
O) > 4M(fO), which implies Qi 2 S for some i with 1  i  j
since l Qp\ Qq (f
N )  4M(fO) by (4.6). Now lQi(fN )  l Qp\ Qq (fN )  4M(fO) contradicts to (4.3).
We are now able to conclude that   16 in all cases, which establishes Theorem 4.1. 2
5 Better evaluation of instability
The instance in Figure 2(c) with 0 < " < 0:5 has the property that its unique optimal routing is a
4 "
4 2" -approximate Nash routing. This instability ratio approaches
7
6 as " ! 0:5. One natural question
is: Shall the instability ratio grow innitely when all SRR instances are taken into account? A negative
answer has been provided in [9] that every SRR instance possess an optimal routing that approximates a
Nash routing within a factor of 54. The gap between 76 and 54 is large, and it is substantially narrowed
down by the following theorem.
Theorem 5.1 The SRR problem admits a (9; 1)-approximate Nash routing.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary instance I = (R; l; (si; ti)ki=1) on ring R = (V;E). For any two ordered nodes
u; v 2 V , let R[u; v] denote the clockwise path in R from u to v. To simplify description, let us shrink
any e 2 E with ae + be = 0 into a node, which obviously has no eect on our result. The preprocessing
reduces us to the setting in which
(C1) ae + be > 0 for all e 2 E.
Let f = fQ1; Q2; : : : ; Qkg be an optimal routing for I such that its potential (f) is minimum
among all optimal routings. Swapping si and ti if necessary, we assume
(C2) Qi is the clockwise path in R from si to ti, i.e., Qi = R[si; ti], for every i = 1; 2; : : : ; k.
If E(Qi) [ E(Qj) = E and E(Qi) \ E(Qj) 6= ; for some 1  i < j  k, then the routing f , obtained
from f by replacing Qi with Qi and Qj with Qj , is optimal, and it can be deduced from condition (C1)
and the denition of  in (2.5) that (f) < (f), a contradiction to the minimality of (f). Hence
17
(C3) For all 1  i; j  k, either E(Qi) \ E(Qj) = ; or E(Qi) [ E(Qj)  E holds.
For each player i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; kg, let routing f i be obtained from f by replacing Qi with Qi. Suppose
without loss of generality that
(C4)
M1(f)
M1(f1)
=
k
max
i=1
Mi(f)
Mi(f i)
.
To prove the theorem, we are to show that f is a (9; 1)-approximate Nash routing for I. To this end,
we assume to the contrary that f is not. By denition 2.2, we see from (C4) that M1(f) > 9M1(f1),
which yields
(C5) l Q1(f
)  l Q1(f1) = M1(f1) < 19M1(f)  19M(f).
It follows from inequality (C5) and Theorem 2.1 that 0 < M1(f)   M1(f1) = (f)   (f1).
The minimality of (f) enforces M(f1) > M(f). Since M1(f1) < M1(f)  M(f) < M(f1), we
have some i 2 f2; 3; : : : ; kg, say i = 2, such that M2(f1) = M(f1) > M(f)  M2(f). Note from
l Q1(f
1) = M1(f1) < M(f1) = M2(f1) = lQ2(f
1) that E(Q1) \ E(Q2) 6= ;, and from M2(f1) > M2(f)
that E(Q2) \ E( Q1) 6= ;. If E(Q1)   E(Q2) = ;, then E(Q2) \ E( Q1) 6= ; implies Q2 ! Q1, in
turn condition (C1) implies M2(f
)
M2(f2)
> M1(f
)
M1(f1)
, contradicting (C4). Hence E(Q1)   E(Q2) 6= ;, which
along with E(Q1) \ E(Q2) 6= ; implies that Q2 has one end in V (Q1)   fs1; t1g and the other in
V ( Q1)   fs1; t1g. Symmetry allows us to assume without loss of generality that s2 2 V (Q1)   fs1; t1g
and t2 2 V ( Q1)  fs1; t1g. Thereby we arrive at the following conguration.
(C6) Nodes s1, s2, t1 and t2 are distinct, and located on R in clockwise order (see Figure 4(a)). Hence
lR[t2;s1](f
)  l Q1(f) < 19M(f) by the string of inequalities in (C5).
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sh tg
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-
-
f
1
... ( )d ={ }Q Q, , , , , ,1 2 Q Qg h
- -
...
f
s i
s j t i
t j
s2
s1
t1
t2
sg
sh tg
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Qg Qh
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sh tg
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Figure 4. Evaluation of instability.
As Figure 4(a-b) shows, the intersection ofQ1 andQ2 is the pathR[s2; t1] bearing a latency lR[s2;t1](f
1)
with respect to f1, which equals M2(f1)   lR[t1;t2](f1) by (C6). Since M2(f1) = M(f1) > M(f) and
lR[t1;t2](f
1)  l Q1(f1) < 19M(f) by (C6) and (C5), we see from (C1) that
(C7) 89M(f
) < M2(f1)  lR[t1;t2](f1) = lR[s2;t1](f1) < lR[s2;t1](f) < M1(f) M(f) and
lR[s1;s2](f
) =M1(f)  lR[s2;t1](f) < 19M(f).
18
Let two sub-multisets S and T of the multiset fQi : i = 1; 2; : : : ; kg be dened as follows (see Figure
4(a) for illustrations of positions of si; ti; sj ; tj):
S := fQi : R[s1; s2]  Qi; lR[s2;ti](f) > 2M(f)=3; 1  i  kg;
T := fQj : R[t1; t2]  Qj ; lR[sj ;t1](f) > 2M(f)=3; 1  j  kg:
It is clear from property (C6) and lR[s2;t1](f
) > 89M(f
) in (C7) that
(C8) Q1 2 S   T and Q2 2 T   S.
Consider Qi 2 S and Qj 2 T . Observe from (C2) and (C6) that Qi  R[s2; ti] and Qj  R[sj ; t1].
Furthermore from lR[s2;ti](f
) > 23M(f
), lR[sj ;t1](f
) > 23M(f
), and lR[s2;t1](f
) < M(f) in (C7), it
can be seen that
(C9) lQi\Qj (f
)  lR[s2;ti]\R[sj ;t1](f) > 13M(f), lR[ti;t1](f) < 13M(f), and
lR[s2;sj ](f
) < 13M(f
) holds for all Qi 2 S and Qj 2 T .
Suppose some Qp (1  p  k) contains R[s2; t1] as a subpath. If Qp 2 S, then Q1  Qp, which along
with (C1) and (C4) enforces Qp = Q1 (though possibly p 6= 1); if Qp 2 T , then Q2  Qp, which together
with (C1) and M2(f1) = M(f1) Mp(f1) implies Qp = Q2 (though possibly p 6= 2). To summarize, we
have shown that if Qp 2 S [ T and R[s2; t1]  Qp for some p 2 f1; 2; : : : ; kg, then Qp = Q1 or Qp = Q2.
This fact, in combination of (C8), (C9), (C3) and (C6), implies
(C10) S\T = ;, and for any paths Qi 2 S and Qj 2 T , their intersection Qi\Qj is a subpath of R[s2; t1],
and R[tj ; si] is a subpath of R[t2; s1].
By (C10), and the nonemptyness of S and T stated in (C8), we can take Qg 2 S and Qh 2 T such
that si 2 R[sg; s1] for all Qi 2 S and tj 2 R[t2; th] for all Qj 2 T (see Figure 4(c)). Properties (C9) and
(C10) give rise to
(C11) Qg \Qh ( R[s2; t1]) bears a latency lQg\Qh(f) > 13M(f), R[th; sg] ( R[t2; s1]) is link disjoint
from all paths in S [ T , lR[tg;t1](f) < 13M(f), and lR[s2;sh](f) < 13M(f).
Let routing f be obtained from f by replacing Qg with Qg and Qh with Qh (see Figure 4(d)). Using
properties (C11) and (C6) and comparing among routings f , f and f1 (cf. Figure 4(d-c-b)) lead to
lR[t1;s2](f)  lR[t1;s1](f1) + jjR[th; sg]jja + lR[s1;s2](f)
 l Q1(f1) + jjR[t2; s1]jja + lR[s1;s2](f)
 2l Q1(f1) + lR[s1;s2](f):
Due to (C5) and (C7), both l Q1(f
1) and lR[s1;s2](f
) are smaller than 19M(f
). Thus
(C12) lR[t1;s2](f) <
1
3M(f
).
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With (2.5), it is not hard to see from Figure 4(b-c-d) that
(f)  (f) = 2lQg\Qh(f)  jjQg \Qhjja  

2lR[th;sg ](f
1) + jjR[th; sg]jja

 lQg\Qh(f)  3lR[th;sg ](f1):
Then the rst inequality and the second inclusion stated in (C11) yield
(f)  (f) > M(f)=3  3lR[t2;s1](f1):
Then from lR[t2;s1](f
) < 19M(f
), implied by the inequalities in (C6), we see (f)   (f) > 0. The
minimality of (f) asserts that f is not an optimal routing, so M(f) < M(f) = Mq(f) for some
q 2 f1; 2; : : : ; kg. We distinguish between two cases, depending on whether q belongs to fg; hg or not.
Case 1: q 2 fg; hg. Symmetry allows us to assume q = g. Then from R[t1; sg]  R[t1; s2], as properties
(C11) and (C6) guarantee, we derive
M(f) < Mq(f) = Mg(f) = l Qg (f) = lR[tg;t1](f) + lR[t1;sg](f)
 lR[tg;t1](f) + lR[t1;s2](f) = lR[tg;t1](f) + lR[t1;s2](f):
By the second inequality in (C11) and inequality (C12), both lR[tg;t1](f
) and lR[t1;s2](f) are smaller than
1
3M(f
). Thus the string of inequalities implies M(f) < 23M(f
), which is absurd.
Case 2: q 62 fg; hg. Then player q adopts the same strategy Qq in both f and f . Comparing f and
f, we see le(fe)  le(fe ) for all e 2 E   E(R[th; sg]). Since lQq (f)  M(f) < Mq(f) = lQq (f), we
must have E(Qq) \ E(R[th; sg]) 6= ;. Hence the second statement in (C11) claims Qq 62 S [ T , implying
lQq\R[s2;t1](f
)  23M(f). Notice from property (C6) that E(R[s2; t1])  E   E(R[th; sg]). So we have
M(f) < lQq (f) = lQq\R[s2;t1](f) + lQq\R[t1;s2](f)
 lQq\R[s2;t1](f) + lR[t1;s2](f)  2M(f)=3 + lR[t1;s2](f):
Again a contradiction M(f) < M(f) arises from lR[t1;s2](f) <
1
3M(f
) in inequality (C12).
The contradiction in either case disproves the assumption that f is not a (9; 1)-approximate Nash
routing. The theorem is established. 2
6 Fast search for good Nash routings
Given an SRR instance I = (R; l; (si; ti)ki=1) as an input, there is no loss of generality in assuming
n  2k, and W = maxe2E(ae + be) is an integer at least 2 (recall (2.1)). The number of bits in the
binary representation of I is 
(k + n logW ), which is considered as the input size of the instance. Let
opt denote the maximum latency of an optimal routing for I. We rst device an O(nk3) time algorithm
to nd a routing ~f for I with M( ~f)  3 opt, then from ~f we reach a Nash routing f in O(nk3W ) time.
This convergence time improves upon the one in [9] by a factor of n, and is achieved by exploiting the
unique structural property of the ring topology.
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6.1 Data structure and subroutines
In our algorithmic implementations, the nodes v1; v2; : : : ; vn of R = (V;E) are ordered in cyclic order.
The source si and destination ti, 1  i  k, are input in terms of v1; v2; : : : ; vn. Fix the clockwise
direction of R to be the one along which v1; v2; : : : ; vn can be encountered in this order. Recalling (2.2),
suppose without loss of generality that Pi (resp. Pi) is a clockwise (resp. counterclockwise) path in R
from si to ti, i = 1; 2; : : : ; k. We associate (record) each path P in the multiset P = [ki=1fPi; Pig with a
unique integer (P ) 2 f1; 2; : : : ; 2kg by putting (Pi) := 2i  1; ( Pi) := 2i, i = 1; 2; : : : ; k. In this way,
given (P ) with P 2 P, we can deduced that
P is a clockwise (resp. counterclockwise) path in R
from sb(P )+12 c to tb(P )+12 c; when (P ) is odd (resp. even):
(6.1)
A routing f = fQ1; Q2; : : : ; Qkg for the instance I is recorded by ordered sequence (Q1); (Q2); : : : ; (Qk)
of integers in stead of the node-sequence representations of these paths.
We call a path in R with end nodes s and t an s-t path. A link in E is often considered a path in
R. A path in R is nontrivial if it has at least one link. Let P  R be a nontrivial vi-vj path, where
1  i < j  n. Set (P ) be the ordered quadruple (vi; v0i; v0j ; vj) satisfying viv0i; v0jvj 2 E(P ). Note that
the vi-vj path P with i < j has (P ) either (vi; vi+1; vj 1; vj) or (vi; vi 1; vj+1; vj), where the additions
and subtractions on subscripts are taken modulo n. In the former case, P does not contain the link
vnv1 2 E, jE(P )j = j  i, and P is said to be of type I. In the latter case, vnv1 2 E(P ), jE(P )j = n j+ i,
and P is said to be of type II. Hence,
Given (P ) for any path P in R, both jE(P )j and the type of P are determined in O(1) time. (6.2)
Moreover, given (P ), the node-sequence representation of P can be produced in O(n) time.
From (6.1) it is easy to see that, given (P ) for P 2 P, it takes O(1) time to produce (P ). So, by
preprocessing, we obtain in O(k) time all (P ), P 2 P. Clearly, this O(k) time does not count in the
time complexity O(nk3) and O(nk3W ) to be established in Sections 6.2 and 6.3. Particularly, array 
has been set up to bind (P ) and (P ) together for P 2 P in way of
[(P )] = (P ); P 2 P: (6.3)
Given (P ) for P 2 P, from either (6.1) or (6.3) we see that jjP jja is computable in O(n) time. Thus, in
O(nk) time array  with
[(P )] = jjP jja; P 2 P; (6.4)
has been constructed for providing data needed in future computation. Similarly, the O(nk) time can be
ignored.
Lemma 6.1 Let Q1 and Q2 be nontrivial paths in R. Given (Q1) and (Q2), it takes O(1) time to
determine whether Q1  Q2 or not, and to determine whether E(Q1) \E(Q2) = ; or not.
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Proof. Suppose (Q1) = (vi; v0i; v
0
j ; vj) and (Q2) = (vp; v
0
p; v
0
q; vq). When Q2 is of type I, Q1  Q2 if and
only if p  i < j  q. When Q1 and Q2 are of type II, Q1  Q2 if and only if i  p < q  j. When Q1 is
of type I and Q2 is of type II, Q1  Q2 if and only if j  p or i  q. Hence, by (6.2), a subroutine can
be devised for determining whether Q1  Q2 or not in O(1) time.
From (Q2) one easily obtains ( Q2) in O(1) time. Note that E(Q1) \ E(Q2) = ; if and only if
Q1  Q2. The above subroutine runs in O(1) time to determine whether Q1  Q2 or not, and hence
E(Q1) \E(Q2) = ; or not. The conclusion follows. 2
Lemma 6.2 Given i with 1  i  k, vpvq 2 E with 1  p < q  n, and (P ) with P 2 P, it takes O(1)
time to determine whether fsi; tig  V (P ) or not, and to determine whether vpvq 2 E(P ) or not.
Proof. Note that fsi; tig  V (P ) if and only if Pi  P or Pi  P . Using array  in (6.3) and using
(vp; vq) = (vp; vq; vp; vq), Lemma 6.1 implies the result. 2
Lemma 6.3 Given routing f for I represented by (Q1); (Q2); : : : ; (Qk), and e = vpvq 2 E, it takes
O(k) time to compute fe, and takes O(nk) time to compute all Mi(f), i = 1; 2; : : : ; k. So M(f) is
derivable in O(nk) time.
Proof. By (6.3) and Lemma 6.2, for every j 2 f1; 2; : : : ; kg, either e 2 Qj or e 62 E(Qj) is checked in O(1)
time. Thus in O(nk) time we get all fe0 , e0 2 E, which enables us to compute Mi(f) = lQi(f) in O(n)
time for every i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; kg. The lemma follows. 2
Lemma 6.4 Given (Q1) and (Q2) for Q1; Q2 2 P, it takes O(1) time to either verify E(Q1)\E(Q2) =
; or compute (P ) for every nontrivial maximal subpath P of Q1 \ Q2. So jjQ1 \ Q2jja is derivable in
O(n) time.
Proof. Checking with array  in (6.3), we get (Q1) = (vi; v0i; v
0
j ; vj) and (Q2) = (v _p; v
0
_p; v
0
_q; v _q). In view
of Lemma 6.1, it remains to consider the case where E(Q1) \ E(Q2) 6= ;, Q1 * Q2 and Q2 * Q1. So we
can denote all of nontrivial maximal subpaths of Q1 \Q2 as X1; Xg with g = 1 or 2. By Lemma 6.2 in
O(1) time we can nd fviv0i; v0jvjg\E(Q2) and fv _pv0_p; v0_qv0_qg\E(Q1), where both sets have size g. Clearly
in O(1) time we can write f{; |g = fi; jg and fp; qg = f _p; _qg such that v{v0{ 2 E(Q2), vpv0p 2 E(Q1),
v0|v| 2 E(Q2) if and only if g = 2, and v0qvq 2 E(Q1) if and only if g = 2. Then (X1) turns out to be
(v{; v0{; v
0
p; vp) if { < p and (vp; v
0
p; v
0
{; v{) otherwise. In case of g = 2, we have (X2) = (v|; v
0
|; v
0
q; vq) if
| < q and (X2) = (vq; v0q; v
0
|; v|) otherwise. 2
6.2 3-approximation to the optimal routing in O(nk3) time
For i = 1; 2; : : : ; k, let fOi; Oig = fPi; Pig satisfy jjOijj  jj Oijj. The routing f := fO1; O2; : : : ; Okg has
the minimum ring latency lR(f) among all routings. In order to nd a routing of maximum latency at
most 3 opt, we use lR(f) as a criterion to distinguish between two cases. When lR(f)  3 opt, the routing
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f has its maximum latency M(f)  lR(f) not more than thrice the optimal, and therefore is the 3-
approximation as desired. When lR(f) > 3 opt, we aim to nd an optimal routing f = fQ1; Q2; : : : ; Qkg
by enumerating in polynomial time.
Consider lR(f) > 3 opt. If f is optimal then we are done by taking f := f. So assume f 6= f,
and therefore
Qh = Oh 2 f and jj Ohjj = max
P2f
jjP jj > jjRjj=2; for some h 2 f1; 2; : : : ; kg: (6.5)
Note that, given h, both Qh and Oh are determined in view of jj Ohjj > jjRjj=2. The path Oh partitions
f1; 2; : : : ; kg into two sets:
S := fi : fsi; tig  V (Oh) or V ( Oh); 1  i  kg and T := f1; 2; : : : ; kg   S: (6.6)
Since lR(f)  lR(f) > 3 opt, we see that
O [ P [Q  R for any O;P;Q 2 f: (6.7)
Hence for any i 2 S, if fsi; tig  V ( Oh) then Qi  Oh = Qh by (6.7), else fsi; tig  V (Oh) and
Qi  Oh = Qh by the maximality in (6.5). In short,
Qi is uniquely determined by Oh (in essence by h) for any i 2 S. (6.8)
Now for any i 2 T , we observe from (6.6) that Qi uses links from both E(Qh) = E( Oh) and E( Qh) =
E(Oh). Write fsh; thg [ [[i2T (fsi; tig \ V (Oh))] = fu0; ujT j+1g [ fui : 1  i  jT jg in way that
u0; u1; : : : ; ujT j; ujT j+1 are encountered in order in a traverse of Oh from sh to th: (6.9)
If E(Qi )[E(Qj )  E( Qh) for some i; j 2 T then Qh[Qi [Qj = R contradicts (6.7). So E(Qi )[E(Qj ) +
E( Qh) for all i; j 2 T , which assures the existence of a maximal subpath  of Qh = Oh that is nontrivial
and link-disjoint from all path Qi , i 2 T . By (6.9) we see that
 is a uj-uj+1 path in Oh for some 0  j  jT j; and all Qi , i 2 T , are determined by . (6.10)
Thus the combination of (6.8) and (6.10) gives f.
To summarize, we make a number of \guesses", and pick the best outcome as an approximation to
the optimal routing. Our guesses, held in a set F , include f = fO1; O2; : : : ; Okg, and routing f (as a
guess of f) with respect to every h 2 f1; 2; : : : ; kg and every possible   Oh, in view of (6.5), (6.6),
(6.8) and (6.10). In total we have at most 1 + k(k  1)  k2 guesses, each of which is a routing put in F
as specied in the following pseudocode.
Approximate Efficient Routing Algorithm (ApxER Alg)
Input: An SRR instance I = (R; l; (si; ti)ki=1) with minimum maximum latency opt.
Output: A routing ~f for I with M( ~f)  3 opt.
1. Determine Oi and Oi for all i = 1; 2; : : : ; k
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2. f  fO1; O2; : : : ; Okg, F  ffg
3. for h = 1 to k do
4. S  i : fsi; tig  V (Oh) or V ( Oh); 1  i  k	, T ! f1; 2; : : : ; kg   S
5. Let u0; u1; : : : ; ujT j; ujT j+1 be as dened in (6.9)
6. for every i 2 S do
7. if fsi; tig  V ( Oh) then Qi  the si-ti path in Oh
8. else Qi  the si-ti path in Oh
9. end-for
10. for j = 0 to jT j do
11.  the uj-uj+1 path in Oh
12. Qi  the si-ti path link-disjoint from , for all i 2 T
13. f  fQ1; Q2; : : : ; Qkg, F  F [ ffg
14. end-for
15. end-for
16. Take ~f 2 F such that M( ~f) is minimum
17. Output ~f
Clearly, Step 1 nishes in O(kn) time. In turn, the construction of f in Step 2 takes O(k) time. By
Lemma 6.2, Step 4 obtains S and T with jSj  k and jT j  k in O(k) time. It is not hard to see that
Step 5 can be accomplished in O(k log k) time with the help of merge sorting [11]. Subsequently, a single
implementation of Steps 7{8 uses O(1) time by Lemma 6.1. In practise, the setting in Step 11 is realized
in O(1) time by dening (), as given fuj ; uj+1g  fv1; v2; : : : ; vng, the set f(); ()g is derivable in
O(1) time, and by Lemma 6.2 the selection of () from the set takes O(1) time. Consequently, Step 12
nishes in O(k) time by Lemma 6.1 and jT j  k. Evidently, Step 13 takes O(k) time. Therefore, in O(k3)
time we have all O(k2) guesses put in F when the for-loop (Steps 3{15) nishes. Recall from Lemma
6.3 that computing M(f) for an f 2 F takes O(nk) time. It follows that algorithm ApxER Alg runs
in O(nk3) time and outputs routing ~f 2 F with M( ~f) minimum. In particular M( ~f)  M(f) since
f 2 F . If M(f)  3 opt, then M( ~f)  3 opt, else by the above argument some optimal routing f must
have been put to F in Step 13 since all possibilities have been enumerated. In conclusion, we have the
following theorem.
Theorem 6.1 Algorithm ApxER Alg nds in O(nk3) time a routing ~f with maximum latency M( ~f) 
3 opt. 2
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6.3 Convergence to Nash routing in O(nk3W ) time
To obtain a Nash routing for the SRR instance I, we make use of the fact in Lemma 2.1(ii): Starting from
~f , the potential of the current routing is decreased iteratively by changing the strategy of a player who has
incentive to deviate, until the potential attains a local minimum. This is accomplished in O(k2opt) time,
and hence in O(nk3W ) time by the following Nash Routing Algorithm (NR Alg), which provides
a more ecient way to identify deviating players, and update the routing data (description) accordingly.
To facilitate our presentation, for any routing f for the instance I and any player i (1  i  k), we
use Qfi to denote the strategy in f of player i, and use f
i to denote the routing obtained from f by only
changing the strategy of player i to Qfi . Note that deriving f
i from f takes O(1) time, as Qfi 2 P and
Qf
i
i (= Q
f
i ) 2 P are presented by integers (Qfi ) and ( Qfi ), respectively.
Nash Routing Algorithm (NR Alg)
Input: An SRR instance I = (R; l; (si; ti)ki=1).
Output: A Nash routing f for I.
1. Apply ApxER Alg to nd a routing ~f for I with M( ~f)  3 opt
2. Compute jjPi \ Pj jja and jjPi \ Pj jja for all 1  i 6= j  k
3. f  ~f , Compute fe for all e 2 E, and Mi(f) for all i = 1; 2; : : : ; k
4. d Pe2E [ae(fe + 1) + be], i 1
5. repeat
6. if d < 2Mi(f) + jjQfi jja
7. then Mj(f) Mj(f)  jjQfj \Qfi jja + jjQfj \ Qfi jja for all j 2 f1; 2; : : : ; kg   fig
8. Mi(f) Mi(f i), f  f i, Update fe for all e 2 E
9. Go to Step 4
10. i i+ 1
11. until i = k + 1
12. Output f
Theorem 6.2 Nash Routing Algorithm nds in O(nk3W ) time a (1; )-Nash routing with   11:7,
and   10:5 if the latencies are homogeneous.
Proof. By Theorem 6.1, in O(nk3) time, Step 1 nds a routing ~f such that
M( ~f)  3 opt and ( ~f)  kM( ~f)  3k opt  3nk2W: (6.11)
The computations in Steps 2 and 3 take O(nk2) time and O(nk) time, respectively, as guaranteed by
Lemmas 6.4 and 6.3. Then NR Alg spends O(n) time getting value d in Step 4. Observe that
Mi(f) + jjQfi jja +Mi(f i) =
X
e2E
 
ae(fe + 1) + be

= d
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holds for all routings f for I and all players i = 1; 2; : : : ; k. The observation shows
d < 2Mi(f) + jjQfi jja ,Mi(f i) < Mi(f); for all i = 1; 2; : : : ; k:
Therefore, it follows from (2.3) and (2.4) that f under investigation is not a Nash routing if and only if
NR Alg nds (by implementing Step 10 a certain number of times) some i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; kg for which the
condition in Step 6 is satised, where by (6.4) searching for this i accomplishes in O(k) time. In addition,
recalling (2.1) and Lemma 2.1(i), the integrality of Mi(f) and Mi(f i) implies
(f i) = (f)   Mi(f) Mi(f i)  (f i)  1: (6.12)
When f is not a Nash routing, Steps 7 and 8 are implemented in O(k) time and O(n) time, respectively,
to reset f as f i, and update Mj(f) for all j = 1; 2; : : : ; k and fe for all e 2 E correctly, where the O(n)
time is enough as f and f i dier only by the strategy player i adopts. Subsequently, NR Alg goes back
to Step 4. From an implementation of Step 4 till the next, O(k) time elapses as n  2k, and (f) reduces
by at least 1 as (6.12) states. Thus, starting from ~f as Step 3 sets, it takes NR Alg time O(nk+k( ~f))
to reach a Nash routing f as Step 12 outputs. The correctness of NR Alg follows directly. By (6.11),
the time complexity O(nk3 + nk2 + nk + k( ~f)) turns out to be O(nk3W ). The performance ratios 
are guaranteed by applying (6.11), and Theorems 3.3 and 3.2 with fO = ~f . 2
The pseudo-polynomial runtime of NR Alg is complemented in some sense by the PLS-completeness
[1] of the problem of nding a Nash equilibrium in an asymmetric congestion game with linear latencies
and undirected links. Also useful is the observation that the SRR model does not possess the matroid
structure [1] which can guarantee polynomial time convergence to a Nash equilibrium by best response
dynamic.
The proof of Theorem 5.1 translates algorithmically to a modication of NR Alg, which we call
ApxNR Alg and nds a (9; 3)-approximate Nash routing inO(nk3+k2opt) time. Similarly,ApxNR Alg
rst nds a routing ~f that satises (6.11). Then with initial setting f := ~f , ApxNR Alg lowers the
potential of f iteratively by changing in each iteration strategies of one or two players under the condition
that the maximum latency of f does not increase. Finally, at the time the potential cannot be reduced
any more, the routing f turns out to be a (9; 3)-approximate Nash routing, as otherwise a contradiction
in Case 1 or 2 of the proof of Theorem 5.1 would occur with f in place of f.
7 Empirical study and concluding remarks
In this section we undertake some empirical study on the SRR, and then conclude the paper with remarks
on future research.
7.1 Empirical study
Our empirical investigations on the SRR of two and three players algorithmically lead us to the following
more accurate evaluation of the PoS.
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Theorem 7.1 (i) The price of stability is 1:25 for the SRR problem with k = 2 players. (ii) The price
of stability is approximately 1:2565 for the SRR problem with k = 3 players, where the absolute error is
no more than 0:0001.
To validate the values, our task here is to come up with an SRR instance I = (R; l; (si; ti)ki=1) for k  3
whose PoS is as large as possible. Clearly, we may assume that the node set of R is fsi; ti : i = 1; 2; kg
(otherwise two links with a common end outside fsi; ti : i = 1; 2; kg can be merged), and further that
the jfsi; ti : i = 1; 2; kgj = 2k (otherwise insertion of links with constant zero latency function(s) can
split identical si and sj or si and tj with i 6= j). The links of R are accordingly labeled as e1; e2; : : : ; e2k
in cyclic order. For i = 1; 2; : : : ; 2k, we write the nonnegative numbers aei and bei , which dene the
latency function lei(x) = aeix + bei on ei, as ai and bi, respectively. In illustration, let us indicate
s1; t1 (resp. s2; t2) by disks (resp. squares), and indicate s3; t3 by solid pentagons when k = 3. Figure 5
exhausts all combinations of positions of source-destination pairs on the ring R (up to renaming players
and swapping source and destination of the same player): cases (a') and (b') for 2-player SRR, and cases
(a){(d) for 3-player SRR.
Figure 5. The SRR of 2 or 3 players.
The 2-player SRR When k = 2, it is not hard to see that case (a') gives a PoS of 1 for all nonnegative
ai; bi, i = 1; 2. In dealing with case (b'), we label all 2k = 4 routings as fj , j = 1; 2; 3; 4, and suppose
without loss of generality that f1 and f2 are as depicted in Figure 5, and that changing the route of
player 1 in routings f1 and f2 gives routings f3 and f4, respectively. The latency of player i in routing fj
can be expressed as a linear function ij = ij(a1; b1; : : : ; a2k ; b2k) of variables a1; b1; a2; b2; : : : ; a2k ; b2k ,
that is
11 = a1 + b1 + 2a2 + b2; 21 = 2a2 + b2 + a3 + b3; : : : ; 24 = a1 + b1 + 2a4 + b4:
The functions ij are then used to describe whether or not a player has an incentive to deviate. For
example, let us consider a sample scenario when it happens that routings f1 and f2 are an optimum
routing and the unique Nash routing, respectively; M(f1) = 21 and M(f2) = 12; and in f3 player 2
wants to deviate. We are to maximize the PoS = 12=21 subject to the constraints 21  11 (saying
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M(f1) = 21), and 21 > 22, 23 > 24, 14 > 12 (saying player 2 in f1, player 2 in f3, player 1 in f4
wish to deviate). Recalling (2.1), this amounts to nding the largest constant p such that the system of
linear inequalities:
(S) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
12   p  2;1  0;
21   11  0;
21   22  1;
23   24  1;
14   12  1;
a1; b1; a2; b2; a3; a4; a4; b4  0
has a feasible integer solution (a1; b1; a2; b2; a3; b3; a4; b4). The task is accomplished by a binary process of
narrowing down the interval [pl; pr) that contains this largest value of p. More specically, the system (S)
is always feasible when p = pl and infeasible when p = pr, meaning that the PoS cannot be greater than
pr in the sample scenario. By checking the middle point of the interval, the interval could be replaced
with either its left half or its right half. The process terminates when the nal interval has a length
pr   pl  0:0001.
Enumerating all scenarios, we similarly construct the corresponding systems of linear inequalities and
intervals [pl; pr). For all nal intervals, we nd no pr greater than 1.2500. It implies that the PoS of the
SRR with k = 2 players is bounded above by 1.25. In turn, the PoS of exact value 1.25 in Theorem 7.1(i)
follows as a corollary of Remark 2.3.
The 3-player SRR When k = 3, more complicate enumerations and computations in the same spirit
provide the results summarized in Table 1 below, where (a){(d) refer to the cases in Figure 5 and 
represents any nonnegative number.
the setting realizing PoS = pl
[pl; pr)
a1 b1 a2 b2 a3 b3 a4 b4 a5 b5 a6 b6
(a) PoS = 1            
(b) PoS = 1            
(c) [1.2499,1.2500) 19 770351 256748 73 256746 37 10 31 256746 37 256739 84
(d) [1.2499,1.2500) 19 26 0 33 260258 31 19 780892 260252 71 520558 21
(e) [1.2564,1.2565) 1152663 21 3227324 32 8 3457818 691582 61 5 4841017 1383109 49
Table 1. The PoS in the SRR of 3 players.
The table gives a universal upper bound 1.2565 on the PoS for all SRR instances with 3 players. From
the setting realizing PoS = 1.2564 in case (e), we draw the conclusion (ii) of Theorem 7.1.
7.2 Concluding remarks
On future research, in addition to the challenges of obtaining the exact PoS in general SRR, the upper
bound 16 on the PoA of the SRR (Theorem 4.1) leaves much room for improvement. Also, it remains
an interesting problem to explore the possibility of nding ecient (approximate) Nash equilibria for
28
the SRR in polynomial time. Another intriguing direction is suggested by the small PoS in the SRR
(Theorem 3.1) and the unbounded PoS in general selsh routing (Figure 1): Characterizing network
topologies of constant PoS deserves further research eorts.
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